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Italiano台湾与旧金山和约系列报导 SFPT - 12
来源 – 转载自:Youtube，文章内容并不代表本网立场和观点。
《12》
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=7yWWkfxj-Po&list=PLniqxcmHbuNxelInZcv4rVMDKfHKdjFbV
Keep an eye on Mega case
兆丰案的来龙去脉
Date: 09/28/2016 Wednesday
Place: Taiwanese American Center 台湾会馆
4413 Fortran Court, San Jose CA 95134
http://taiwanus.net/news/press/2016/201609221245011517.htm
全民紧盯兆丰案
根据纽约金融署，於二０一六年八月十九日宣布的认罪同意令， 兆丰银行应：
1)於执行令下达十天内，支付全部一亿八千万美元的罚款，任命独立法遵顾问，并选择一个独立监管； 2）在三十天内，持续维持一个独立监管机制； 3）在六十天内完成法遵稽核，并提交稽查报告，包括所有已知、涉嫌违反法律，或任何违犯法律、规范的可疑交易； 4）聘请法遵顾问，为期长达六个月，执行谘询、监督，并提报兆丰纽约分行存在的缺失；5）保留一个独立监管机制为期最少两年，从事：一）审查纽约兆丰反洗钱法、遵循运作；二）重新稽核纽约兆丰，於二０一二年一月一日至二０一四年间的美元对冲，以确定纽约兆丰是否适当确认，并提报所有在、与、经该行的交易，都遵循反洗钱法及外资控管室规定。
纽约兆丰与科隆自由贸易区之间的美元交易额，二０一三年为卅五亿、二０一四年为廿四亿，与巴拿马市分行交易额，分别为十一亿、与四十五亿。
现在头三十天已经过去了，啥事搞定？没看到兆丰银行有任何自发行动，只知金管会开罚兆丰银行一千万台币，禁止在内部管理改善前到国外增设分支机构，同时撤销，前董事长蔡友才、前总经理吴汉卿、副总经理梁美琪、总稽核刘小玲、法遵长陈天禄、及纽约分行经理黄士明等人职务。
是否台湾金管会开罚，就搞定美国金融署的认罪同意令条款？当然门都没有，兆丰银行是被要求，任命一个独立法遵顾问、选定并维持一个独立监管机构，它啥事都没做，只一再推委不当交易，〈还有小数点点错〉并不构成可疑活动。
其实，当电汇给一个已关闭银行账户，被退汇给发件人时，就必须专案呈报，这是全球都遵守的标准作业程序，为什麽单独纽约兆丰给巴拿马兆丰的电汇例外，不需遵循？它当然构成一个可疑交易。
正如金融署认罪同意令第廿一条d款所指：「於二０一０至二０一四年间，纽约兆丰从事了为数可观的付款授权，它发生在巴拿马受款人账户，早被个郎分行关闭，因其未能善尽熟知您的客户职责，这就是一个高度可疑行为。更离谱的是，这些帐号开户大多不到两年，有些甚至还不到一年，就予关闭。启人疑窦的事实是，这些可疑付款冲销汇款者与受益者均为同夥，有些案是付款通知，在受款人帐户关闭数个月後才送出，而且这类可疑付款冲销，至少一直延续到二０一五年。
显然，金管会未尽其职，其一千万台币罚款，并无法结案，它反而激起全民关注，紧盯案情发展的迫切需要。
为什麽兆丰银行会在，长久以来被认定是，洗钱高风险区的巴拿马，开两家分行？难道兆丰银行只是违反了反洗钱法，或者是更离谱，他们明目张胆地藐视法律，公然参与实际洗钱？
兆丰银行必须公开，其自二０一０到去年，相关可疑的往来帐户，披露谁是真正的汇款人和收款人。坦白从宽，掩盖真相，只是会让情况恶化、变得更糟。
谢镇宽
加州、海沃
【相关资讯】
http://www.cazila.com/forum.php?mod=viewthread&tid=28999
政经看民视20160921
http://taiwanus.net/news/press/2016/201609141717151304.htm
兆丰案纽约法院判决 Mega Case decided by NY Court
http://www.taipeitimes.com/News/editorials/archives/2016/09/22/2003655663
TAIPEI TIMES
Home / Editorials
Thu, Sep 22, 2016 – Page 8
[ LETTER ]
Keep an eye on Mega Bank
Under the settlement provision of the New York Department of Financial Services (DFS) Consent Order announced on Aug. 19, Mega International Commercial Bank’s New York branch should do the following:
One, within 10 days of executing the order, pay the entire US$180 million fine, engage an independent compliance consultant and select an independent monitor; two, within 30 days, retain an independent monitor; three, within 60 days, complete a compliance review and submit a compliance report that includes all known or suspected violations of law, or suspicious transactions to law enforcement and supervisory authorities; four, engage a compliance consultant for up to six months to oversee and address deficiencies in Mega Bank New York’s compliance function; five, retain an independent monitor for a minimum of two years to conduct a review of Mega Bank New York’s money laundering compliance program and a lock-back review of the bank’s US currency clearing transactions from Jan. 1, 2012, to Dec. 31, 2014, to determine whether it properly identified and reported all transactions occurring at, by, or through the branch in accordance with the applicable money laundering and Office of Foreign Assets Control laws and regulations.
The US dollar value of credit transactions between Mega Bank NY and Colon FTZ was US$3.5 billion in 2013 and and US$2.4 billion in 2014. Corresponding figures for the Panama City branch were US$1.1 billion and US$4.5 billion.
Now the first 30 days is over, what has been done? There is no report of Mega International Commercial Bank’s voluntary action, but the Financial Supervisory Commission fined it NT$10 million (US$318,167). The bank is not allowed to set up new overseas branches until it improves internal management and dismisses former chairman Mckinney Tsai (蔡友才), former president Wu Hann-ching (吴汉卿), vice president Liang Mei-chi (梁美琪), chief audit officer Liu Hsiao-ling (刘小铃) and chief compliance officer Chen Tien-lu (陈天禄), as well as New York branch president Huang Shih-ming (黄士明).
Will the commission’s requirements meet New York DFS’ order provision? Not at all. Mega Bank is required to engage an independent compliance consultant, select and retain an independent monitor. It has done nothing but claims irregular transactions did not constitute suspicious activity.
Well, it is standard practice that wire transfers to a closed bank account are returned to the sender, a regulatory filing is required around the world, so why not for transactions from Mega Bank NY to Mega Bank Panama? That absolutely constitutes a suspicious activity.
As the DFS report said in Article 21.d: “A significant number of reported debit authorizations processed by Mega-NY between 2010 and 2014 occurred when the Panamanian beneficiary accounts identified in the underlying transactions were closed by the Colon FTZ Branch because of inadequate Know-Your-Customer documentation received by that branch — a highly suspicious level of activity. Moreover, most of these accounts were open for less than two years; a number were open even less than one year — further evidence of very questionable activity. The suspicious nature of this activity is compounded by the fact that the remitters and beneficiaries associated with many of the Suspicious Payment Reversals were identical parties; in some cases, the original payment instructions were sent months after the beneficiary accounts had already been closed. Moreover, the Suspicious Payment Reversals continued at least into 2015.”
Obviously, the commission did not do its job correctly. The commission’s NT$10 million fine is not a solution to this case. Instead, it highlights the urgent need for citizen oversight.
Why did Mega Bank open two branches in Panama, which has historically been recognized as a high-risk jurisdiction for money laundering? Did it simply break money laundering laws or, worse, did it choose to flagrantly disregard regulations and participate in money laundering?
Mega Bank must frankly disclose the suspicious transactions from 2010 to last year and reveal who the senders and recipients were. A cover-up will always make things worse.
John Hsieh
Hayward, California
