由％s發布 | 9月 28, 2020

中美關係 中美脫鉤

轉自：program-think.blogspot.com , 旨在為讀者提供多元信息，文章內容並不代表本網立場和觀點。

文章目錄

★作者簡介
★本文簡介
★中英文對照
★俺的點評

「中美對抗」正在【加劇】，大伙兒應該都感受到了。上次的博文，俺轉載了幾篇文章，都是關於「科技脫鉤」這個話題。今天再單獨轉載一篇比較長的文章，談【美國對華戰略】。

★作者簡介

此文的作者【約瑟夫·奈】（Joseph Nye）是知名的美國學者（當過哈佛大學肯尼迪政府學院的院長），因提出「軟實力」（soft power）理論聞名遐邇。上世紀末本世紀初，此人先後擔任過美國助理國防部長、國家情報委員會主席、副國務卿等高層職務。從其履歷可以看出——在美國外交界具有相當的影響力。順便說一下：俺的網盤上分享過他寫的《理解國際衝突——理論與歷史》一書。

在政治派繫上，他應該算【民主黨】那邊。（從此文可以看出）在對華戰略方面，有些地方他與川普是一致滴，有些則完全不同。俺在博客評論區與讀者交流時提到過：美國兩黨在【反中】這個大方向上早已達成一致，差別在於具體如何落實（戰略上達成一致，戰術上存在分歧）。

由於臨近美國大選，很多讀者都在關心：「假如拜登贏得2020大選，美國對華戰略會出現哪些變化？」通過這篇文章可以獲得某種參考（僅僅是參考，未來總是會有變數）。

★本文簡介

這篇文章發表在美國國防大學（NDU）主辦的《稜鏡》季刊（2020年第8卷第4期），原文標題是《Perspectives for a China Strategy》，發表時間：2020年6月。官網原始出處在「這裏」。

中文翻譯發表在「國際網」（此網站隸屬於官方的「中國國際問題研究基金會」）。考慮到該網站的官方背景，再放一個互聯網檔案館的網頁存檔（鏈接在「這裏」）。

本來俺沒打算搞「中英雙語對照」（那個中文翻譯【沒】註明英文原始出處）。鑒於上述網站具有【朝廷】背景，俺就多留了個心眼——找到英文原文，並稍微對照了一下。結果在第1段就發現大量的刪節。既然如此，俺索性就把【中英文對照】逐段貼出來，並且逐一對比了刪節的情況。那些比較短的刪節，俺稍微補充了中文翻譯；至於【大段的】刪節，俺比較懶，就請大伙兒自己去看原文吧（作為本博客的讀者，基本的英文閱讀能力，應該是有的吧？）

為了方便大夥對照，那些翻譯過程中被刪節的英文原文都標註了下劃線，俺個人在中譯文裏面插入的註釋及修訂，也採用（小括弧加下劃線）的樣式，以示區分。另外，中譯文裏面的粗體也是俺加註滴。

★中英文對照（英文原文中文翻譯）

When the Munich Security Conference met in February 2020, China was the most frequently mentioned country, while there was an exaggerated mood of Western decline. Yet as the recent COVID-19 pandemic has shown, China has both strengths and weaknesses. Its initial censorship, suppression of feedback and curtailment of international information allowed the pandemic to develop and fester. Draconian quarantine of Wuhan curtailed its spread somewhat; followed by a government propaganda campaign to attract others to the theme that China’s behavior had been benign. When the pandemic eventually subsides, however, China will be faced with the political and economic costs resulting from the exposure of both a failed public health system and an overly rigid party control system.

2020年2月召開的慕尼黑安全會議使中國成為世界範圍內最受關注的國家。與之相比，西方衰落的聲音卻甚囂塵上。然而，隨著新冠肺炎疫情的爆發和蔓延，中國的優勢和弱點也體現得非常明顯。

（編程隨想注：中譯文明顯比原文少了很多。因為被和諧掉了一段「吐槽中國抗疫」的文字）

Beyond the COVID-19 crisis, we face the larger question of how to frame a strategy toward the inexorably rising China. The perennial theme of Western decline is not new, though the role of China is. Oswald Spengler opined about the decline of the West over a century ago. During the Cold War, American pundits and politicians went through several cycles of belief in declinism that featured fear of the Soviet Union. In the end, however, when it turned out to be the Soviet Union that declined many proclaimed the West triumphant. In his 1992 book The End of History and the Last Man, Francis Fukuyama wrote that humanity had reached “the end-point of mankind’s ideological evolution and the universalization of Western liberal democracy as the final form of human government.” A few years later, Samuel Huntington issued a gloomier prognosis in The Clash of Civilizations and the Remaking of World Order that “the rise of China and the increasing assertiveness of this ‘biggest player in the history of man’ will place tremendous stress on international stability in the early twenty-first century.”(1) Today the prevailing fear is indeed the rise of China. Accordingly the 2017 version of the National Security Strategy of the United States focuses on great power competition with China, and to a lesser extent with Russia.

除了新冠疫情引發的危機外，美國還面臨著一個更大的挑戰，即如何制定一項恰當的對華戰略來遏制中國崛起。「西方衰落論」是老生常談。早在一個多世紀前，奧斯瓦爾德·斯賓格勒就曾對西方衰落髮表過見解。冷戰期間，為數眾多的美國學者和政治家出於對蘇聯的恐懼，始終秉持衰落主義的觀點。但最終卻是蘇聯率先解體，對此，許多人宣稱這是西方的勝利。弗朗西斯·福山在其1992年出版的《歷史的終結與最後的人》中寫道，人類已經達到了「意識形態進化的頂點，而西方的自由民主政體將作為政府的最終形式得以普遍存續」。幾年後，塞繆爾·亨廷頓在《文明的衝突與世界秩序的重建》中發表了（更為）悲觀的預言：「中國的崛起及其日益自信，將給21世紀初的國際穩定帶來巨大的壓力。」如今，中國崛起已經成為人們的普遍憂慮。鑒於此，2017版的《美國國家安全戰略》聚焦與中國和俄羅斯的大國競爭。

（編程隨想注：最後一句略微篡改了願意——原文強調：「美中之爭」超過了「美俄之爭」）

In a longer historical perspective, this century is witnessing not the rise, but the recovery of Asia. Western civilization did not fully flower until 1500, and before 1800 Asia (including India and Japan as well as China) was home to more than half the world’s population and world economy. By 1900, however, while Asia still represented more than half the world’s population its share of the global economy had fallen to only 20 percent. Meanwhile the industrial revolution in Europe and North America and their domination of the seas made Europe the center of the global balance of power—until it tore itself apart in World War I. As I wrote a decade ago, the 21st century will see the return of Asia, but Asia is much more than just China.(2) Asia has its own internal balance of power, and many Asian states welcome a Western presence to make sure they are not dominated by China.(3)

從（更長遠的）歷史角度來說，本世紀我們並不是在見證亞洲的崛起，而是在見證亞洲的復興。西方文明直到16世紀才孕育成熟，而在19世紀以前，亞洲（印度、日本和中國）擁有世界一半以上的人口和財富。直到20世紀，亞洲人口仍佔世界總人口的半數以上，但其在全球經濟中所佔份額已降至 20%。與此同時，歐洲的工業革命及其對海洋的控制使其迅速成為世界中心，其霸主地位一直延續至一戰結束。我在10年前就已經說過，21世紀將見證亞洲的回歸，但亞洲不是只有一個中國。亞洲內部有著自己的力量平衡，許多亞洲國家歡迎西方的存在，從而確保自身不被中國支配。

（編程隨想注：作者在這段提及了：亞洲內部有著自己的力量平衡。很長時間以來，美國全球戰略的核心原則就是——**確保世界島（歐亞大陸）的均勢**。關於這方面的詳細闡述，可以參考布熱津斯基的代表作《大棋局——美國的首要地位及其地緣戰略》一書。俺的網盤上分享了此書的電子版）

The United States became the world’s largest economy at the end of the 19th century, but it was not until it tipped the outcome of World War I that it became crucial to the global balance of power. Failing to understand that balance, America retreated into isolationism, and the 1930s was a disastrous decade. Following World War II, Presidents Franklin Roosevelt, Harry Truman, and Dwight Eisenhower avoided the mistakes of isolationism and created the institutions of what would become the Western liberal order.

美國在19世紀末成為世界最大經濟體，但其真正能夠對世界力量平衡產生重大影響還要追溯到一戰後。由於美國未能把握住機會，在20世紀30年代又重回孤立主義。直到二戰後，在富蘭克林·羅斯福、哈里·杜魯門和德懷特·艾森豪威爾總統的努力下，美國才得以避免重蹈孤立主義的覆轍，開創了後來成為西方自由秩序的制度。

Some contemporary realists believe the rise of China portends a conflict that will tear the world apart similar to the sundering of Europe in 1914. Graham Allison has warned of a “Thucydides Trap” invoking the history of the Peloponnesian War which was caused by the rise in power of Athens and the fear it created in Sparta. While Allison’s historical cases and numbers have been questioned, his metaphor serves a useful warning.(4) Strategists must pay attention both to the rise of China and the fear it creates in the United States.

部分當代現實主義者認為，中國崛起預示著一場撕裂世界的衝突，就像1914年歐洲的分裂。格雷厄姆·艾利森曾警告說，「修昔底德陷阱」將使類似伯羅奔尼撒戰爭的歷史得以重現。伯羅奔尼撒戰爭爆發的原因，正是雅典的崛起及其給斯巴達帶來的恐懼。儘管艾利森援引的案例和數據遭受質疑，但他的觀點不失為一個有用的預警。戰略家必須關注中國崛起。

（編程隨想注：中譯文的最後一句有刪節。原文應為：戰略家必須同時注意「中國的崛起」以及「中國崛起在美國造成的恐懼感」。
文中提及的「修昔底德」是古希臘歷史學家，其代表作《伯羅奔尼撒戰爭史]》對「歷史、政治、外交」等諸多領域有深刻影響。[俺的網盤](https://github.com/programthink/books)上分享了此書的電子版。）

Assessing Chinese Power

對中國實力的再評估。

It is equally dangerous to over- or underestimate Chinese power. Underestimation breeds complacency, while overestimation creates fear—either of which can lead to miscalculation. Good strategy requires careful net assessment. Many current, gloomy projections rest on exaggerations of China’s strength and Western weakness. Some observers warn that the rise of China will spell the end of the American era, but this is far from clear.(5) Nonetheless, failure to successfully cope with the rise of China could have disastrous consequences for America and the rest of the world.

高估或低估中國實力的做法均不可取。低估容易助長自滿情緒，高估容易滋生恐慌心理，而這二者均會導致誤判。一項成功的戰略需要進行細緻的凈評估。目前，大多數持悲觀態度的預測都是基於對中國實力的誇大和對西方弱點的放大。部分觀察人士警告稱，中國崛起意味著美國時代終結，但這一點還遠未明朗。然而，如果不能成功應對中國崛起，美國和世界其他國家可能會面臨災難性後果。

Contrary to current conventional wisdom, China has not yet replaced the United States as the world’s largest economy. Today China’s economy is only about two-thirds that of the United States, and an even smaller fraction if Europe, Japan, Australia, and other Western allies are included. Measured in purchasing power parity, the Chinese economy became larger than the American economy in 2014, but purchasing power parity is an economist’s device for comparing estimates of welfare, not for measuring power. For example, oil and jet engines are imported at current exchange rates, not some notional purchasing power adjustment. Gross Domestic Product (GDP) is in any case a very crude measure of power. For the first half of its “century of humiliation” that started with the opium wars with Britain in 1839, China had the world’s largest GDP (and military) but that did not accurately describe the balance of power.(6) Per capita income gives a better index of the sophistication of an economy; American per capita income is several times that of China.

與傳統觀點相左的是，中國還沒有取代美國躋身世界最大經濟體。目前，中國的經濟規模約佔美國的 2/3，如果再把歐洲、日本、澳大利亞和其他西方盟友計算在內，這個比例還要降低。如果按購買力平價（PPP）來衡量，2014年中國的經濟規模超過了美國，但購買力平價只是經濟學家估算福利的一種手段，不能用於衡量國家實力。（編程隨想注：此處有刪節。原文中舉了「石油＆噴氣發動機」的例子）同樣，國內生產總值也是一個非常粗略的衡量指標。這就好比鴉片戰爭前的中國，擁有世界上最大的 GDP（和軍隊），但卻並不能如實反映其國家實力。相比之下，人均收入能夠更好地反映一個經濟體的複雜程度，而美國的人均收入數倍于中國。

Many economists expect China to pass the United States someday as the world’s largest economy (measured as GDP in dollars), but the estimated date varies from 2030 to mid-century depending on what one assumes about the rates of Chinese and American growth, and whether either country stumbles along the projected ahistorical linear paths. Past growth rates are not good predictors.

許多經濟學家預計，中國有朝一日將超越美國，成為世界最大經濟體，但具體時間從2030年到本世紀中葉不定。這主要取決於人們對中美兩國經濟增速的預期，以及兩國能否打破歷史規律相向而行。

（編程隨想注：最後一句翻譯不當，且有刪節。原文大意是：這主要取決於人們對中美兩國經濟增速的假設，以及兩國是否都沿著預期的增長曲線發展。過去的發展軌跡並【不是】可靠的預測依據。）

By any measure, however, the gravitational pull of China’s economy is increasing. China is now the world’s largest manufacturer and the major trading partner of nearly every country in the world.(7) Not only does its growing economy support military and aid expenditures, but access to the Chinese market and its ability to set standards for that market are a significant source of political influence.

然而，無論以何種標準衡量，中國經濟的吸引力都在日益凸顯。中國目前是全球最大製造國，也是絕大多數國家的主要貿易夥伴。中國不斷增長的經濟實力不僅為其軍力發展和對外援助提供了助力，而且日益成為其擴大政治影響力的重要基礎。

As we have seen above, Thucydides famously attributed the outbreak of the Peloponnesian War to two causes: the rise of a new power—Athens, and the fear that created in an established power—Sparta. Most readers focus on the first half of Thucydides assessment, but the second is equally important to strategic planning and more within our control. Most Sinologists properly doubt that U.S. foreign policy can prevent the rise of China’s economy, but if we use our contextual intelligence well, we can avoid the exaggerated fears that could provoke a new cold or worse, a hot war. Even if China someday surpasses the United States in total economic size, that is not the only measure of geopolitical power. As we saw, the United States became the world’s largest economy at the end of the 19th century, but did not become a central player in the global balance of power until three decades later in the context of World War I. Economic might is just part of the equation.

正如我們前面所提到的，修昔底德將伯羅奔尼撒戰爭的爆發歸結為兩個原因：一是新勢力雅典的崛起，二是舊勢力斯巴達的恐慌。大部分讀者只關注前者，卻忽視了後者同樣對戰略規劃具有重要意義。大部分漢學家對美國外交政策能夠阻止中國經濟崛起的觀點持懷疑態度，但如果我們能夠善用情境智慧能力（原譯者注：指有目的地適應環境、塑造環境和選擇新環境的能力），我們將有可能避免因過分恐慌而引發的新一輪冷戰或熱戰。即便中國有朝一日在經濟總量上超越美國，這也不是衡量地緣政治實力的唯一標準。正如我們所見，美國在19世紀末成為世界最大經濟體，但直到30年後才藉助一戰這個大背景成為全球力量平衡中的核心角色。因此，經濟實力只是這個等式中的一部分。

In terms of military might China is well behind the United States. U.S. military expenditure is several times that of China. While Chinese military capabilities have been increasing in recent years and pose new challenges to U.S. and Western forces in the region, China is not a global peer. Nor will it be able to exclude the United States from the Western Pacific so long as the United States maintains its alliance and bases in Japan. Despite its non-nuclear status, Japan anchors the first island chain and possesses a formidable military which exercises regularly with U.S. forces. Despite trade tensions, the U.S.-Japan alliance is stronger today than it was thirty years ago at the end of the Cold War.

就軍事力量而言，中國遠遠落後於美國。美國的軍費開支是中國的4倍（編程隨想注：中譯文篡改了原文，原文寫的是「數倍」而不是「4倍」）。儘管中國的軍力近年來不斷增強，並對美國和西方在該地區的軍隊構成挑戰，但在全球層面，中國還不是美國的對手。只要美國維持美日同盟關係，保持前沿軍事存在，中國就不能將美國排除在西太平洋之外。儘管日本沒有核力量，但它擁有一支強大的軍隊，並經常與美軍舉行聯合演習，堪稱第一島鏈的支柱。雖然日美之間存在貿易摩擦，但如今的美日同盟比30年前冷戰結束時還要穩固。

Sometimes analysts draw pessimistic conclusions from war games played in the limited context of Taiwan. However, with China’s vital energy supply lines vulnerable to American naval domination in the Persian Gulf and Indian Ocean, it would be a mistake for China’s leaders to assume that a naval conflict near Taiwan (or in the South China Sea) would stay limited to that region.

分析人士有時會從基於台海背景下的軍事推演中得出悲觀的結論。然而值得注意的是，由於中國位於波斯灣和印度洋上的重要能源供應線易受美國海軍控制，因此，**假如中國領導人認為在台灣（或南中國海）附近海域發生的海上衝突僅僅是一場地區規模衝突，那就大錯特錯了。

China has also invested heavily in soft power, the ability to get preferred outcomes through attraction rather than coercion or payment. Cultural exchanges and Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) projects can enhance China’s attractiveness, but the BRI is more like a successful marketing propaganda than a true Marshall Plan for the world. BRI projects range from those that promote economic infrastructure to those designed primarily to contain India.(8) Chinese soft power faces two major limits. Ongoing territorial conflicts with neighbors such as Japan, India, Vietnam, and the Philippines make it difficult for China to appear attractive while contesting rival claims. And domestic insistence on tight Communist Party control deprives China of the benefits of civil society that European countries or the United States enjoy. Authoritarian responses to artists like Ai Wei Wei and dissidents like Liu Xiaobo, or the cultural repression in Xinjiang limit China’s attractiveness in democratic societies. In measuring soft power, opinion polls as well as a recent index published by Portland, a London consultancy, ranked China in twenty-sixth place while the United States ranked near the top.(9) Ironically, Mao Tse Tung’s brutal but ideological Communism in the 1960s had a far greater transnational soft power appeal.

中國為提升軟實力投入了大量資金，以期通過吸引而不是脅迫的方式來達成目的。文化交流和「一帶一路」倡議有助於提升中國的吸引力，特別是「一帶一路」倡議，它既包含促進經濟基礎設施發展的項目，也有遏制印度的目的。但該倡議終歸不是世界性的「馬歇爾計劃」，它更像一種市場營銷所用的宣傳手段。

（編程隨想注：此處有【大量刪節】。作者指出天朝發展「軟實力」所面臨的幾大困難。被刪節的原因有可能是——這段英文提及了「劉曉波＆艾未未」這兩個不可說的名字，還提及了黨國在新疆乾的那些破事兒）

就衡量軟實力而言，倫敦波特蘭諮詢公司最近發布的一項指數將中國排在第26位，而美國則接近榜首。

（編程隨想注：作者在本段落末尾的吐槽被河蟹了。原文是：諷刺的是，60年代毛澤東那野蠻的共產主義意識形態與如今相比具有更大的軟實力/跨國吸引力。
如果你不理解這句話的意思，俺稍微解釋一下：毛臘肉發動文革的那會兒，法國的學生運動中，有不少人是【毛主義】的信徒。俺多次在博文中提醒過大伙兒：馬列理論體系具有很強的【欺騙性＆忽悠性】）

China’s huge economic scale matters; it is an inescapable fact. The United States was once the world’s largest trading nation and largest bilateral lender. Today nearly one hundred countries count China as their largest trading partner, compared to fifty-seven that have such a relationship with the United States. China plans to lend more than a trillion dollars for infrastructure projects with its Belt and Road Initiative over the next decade, while the United States has cut back aid. China’s economic success story enhances its soft power, and government control of access to its large market provides hard power leverage. Moreover, China’s authoritarian politics and mercantilist practices make its economic power readily usable by the government. China will gain economic power from the sheer size of its market as well as its overseas investments and development assistance.

中國巨大的經濟規模至關重要，這是一個無法迴避的事實。美國曾是世界最大貿易國和最大雙邊貸款國。然而如今，有近100個國家將中國視為最大貿易夥伴，而與美國建立這種關係的國家只有57個。中國計劃在未來十年向「一帶一路」倡議中的基礎設施建設項目提供超過1萬億美元的貸款，而美國則在削減援助。中國在經濟上的成功提升了它的軟實力，而政府對市場准入的控制則起到了強有力的槓桿作用。此外，中國的威權政治和重商主義使其經濟實力很容易被政府利用。中國還將從其龐大的市場規模和海外投資及發展援助中獲利。

Of the seven giant global companies in the age of Artificial Intelligence (Google, Facebook, Amazon, Microsoft, Baidu, Alibaba, and Tencent), three, or nearly half are Chinese. And Chinese companies dare not defy the Chinese Communist Party, rendering them tools in China’s geostrategic competition toolkit. With the world’s largest population, its largest internet audience, and while data resources are becoming the “new oil” of world politics, China is poised to become the Saudi Arabia of big data.(10) Overall, Chinese power relative to the United States is likely to increase.

在人工智慧時代，全球7大巨頭中（谷歌、Facebook、亞馬遜、微軟、百度、阿里巴巴和騰訊）中有近半數來自中國。中國企業聽命于執政黨，這使它們成為中國地緣戰略競爭的工具。中國擁有全世界最多的人口和互聯網受眾，在數據資源日益成為世界政治「新石油」的背景下，中國正蓄勢待發，有望成為大數據領域的沙烏地阿拉伯。總而言之，相較於美國，中國的實力正在不斷增強。

American Assets

美國擁有的資產

In assessing the balance of power, it is important to remember that the United States has some long-term power advantages that will persist regardless of current Chinese actions. One is geography. The United States is surrounded by two oceans and benign neighbors that are likely to remain friendly. China has borders with fourteen countries and has territorial disputes with India, Japan, Vietnam, and the Philippines among others. Energy independence is another American advantage.(11) A decade ago, the United States seemed hopelessly dependent on imported energy. The recent shale revolution has transformed it from energy importer to energy exporter, and the International Energy Agency projects that North America may be self-sufficient in the coming decade. Meanwhile, China is becoming ever-more dependent on energy imports, and much of the oil it imports is transported through the Indian Ocean and the South China Sea, where the United States and others maintain a significant naval presence. Eliminating this vulnerability will take decades.

在進行實力評估時，需要切記，美國擁有的某些優勢將不受中國影響而長期存續。首先是地理區位優勢。美國被兩洋環抱，且周邊遍布友好鄰邦。相比之下，中國雖與14個國家接壤，但與印度、日本、越南和菲律賓等國都存在領土爭端。其次是能源獨立優勢。10年前的美國嚴重依賴能源進口，但近年來卻依靠「頁岩氣革命」從能源進口國搖身一變成為能源出口國。（編程隨想注：中譯文遺漏了這句——國際能源署預測，北美在未來十年內可以實現能源的自給自足。）與此同時，中國對能源進口的依賴程度卻不斷提高，且大部分進口石油需要途徑印度洋和南中國海，而美國及其盟友在上述海域保持著強大的軍事存在。

（編程隨想注：中譯文刪節了最後一句——中國要消除此弱點將需要數十年的時間。）

The United States enjoys financial power derived from its large transnational financial institutions as well as the role of the U.S. dollar. Of the foreign reserves held by the world’s governments, just 1.1 percent are in yuan, compared with 64 percent for the dollar. While China aspires to a larger role, a credible reserve currency depends on currency convertibility, deep capital markets, honest government, and the rule of law—all lacking in China and not quickly developed. While China could divest its large holdings of dollars, such action would risk damaging its own economy as much as the United States. China dumping dollars might bring the United States to its knees, but it would have a similar effect on China itself.

美國的金融實力源自其龐大的跨國金融機構以及美元的地位。在世界各國政府持有的外匯儲備中，人民幣僅占 1.1%，而美元則占 64%。儘管人民幣渴望扮演更重要的角色，但可靠的外匯儲備取決於貨幣的可兌換性、深厚的資本市場、完善的法治，而這些恰恰是中國的短板。儘管中國可以選擇拋售其所持有的大量美元給美國造成衝擊，但這種做法無疑是「殺敵一千自損八百」。

（編程隨想注：說到「【法治】對金融市場的重要性」，可以參見前不久的博文《如何理解「英美法系」（普通法系）——從「英國古代史」聊到「香港國安法」》）

Power in interdependent relations depends upon asymmetric vulnerability and there are too many symmetries in U.S.-China interdependence at this point, though that might change if there is a much more radical decoupling. Although the dollar cannot remain pre-eminent forever, and American overuse of financial sanctions creates incentives for other countries to look for other financial instruments, the yuan is unlikely to displace the dollar in the near term.

（編程隨想注：本段開頭部分被刪節。原文是——在相互依賴的雙方，權力來自於【不對稱】的脆弱性。在這點上，美中的相互依賴關係中存在著太多對稱的脆弱性。假如進行更徹底的脫鉤，這種狀況可能會改變。）

（雖然）美元不可能永遠佔據主導地位，且美國過度利用金融制裁會刺激其他國家轉而尋求替代金融工具，但人民幣在短期內也不太可能取代美元的地位。

The United States also has demographic strengths. It is the only major developed country that is currently projected to hold its place (third) in the demographic ranking of countries. While the rate of American population growth has slowed in recent years, it is not shrinking as are the populations of Russia, Europe, and Japan. Seven of the world’s fifteen largest economies will face a shrinking workforce over the next decade and a half, including China whose population will decline by 9 percent, while the U.S. workforce is likely to increase by 5 percent. China will soon lose its first-place population rank to India, and its working age population already peaked in 2015. Chinese worry about “growing old before growing rich.”

(12)美國在人口方面也具有優勢。美國是世界人口排名前十國家中的唯一主要發達國家。雖然近年來美國人口增速有所放緩，但並沒有像俄羅斯、歐洲和日本那樣出現持續的負增長。未來15年，全球15大經濟體中的7個將面臨勞動力萎縮，其中就包括中國，其人口將減少 9%，而美國的勞動力可能會增長 5%。中國人口第一的位置很快將被印度取代，而中國的勞動適齡人口在2015年已經達到峰值。中國人普遍擔心「未富先老」。

America has been at the forefront in the development of key technologies (bio, nano, information) that are central to this century’s economic growth, and American research universities dominate higher education. In a 2019 ranking by Shanghai Jiaotong University, fifteen of the top twenty global universities were in the United States; none were in China.

美國始終處於關鍵技術（生物、納米、信息技術）領域的發展前沿，而這些技術恰恰是本世紀經濟增長的核心驅動力。此外，美國的研究型院校主導高等教育。根據上海交大2019年發布的排名，全球前20名的大學中有15所在美國，而中國大學無一上榜。

To challenge U.S. dominance in this domain, China is investing heavily in research and development; it competes well in some fields now, and has set a goal to be the global leader in artificial intelligence by 2030. Some experts believe that with its enormous data resources, lack of privacy restraints on how data is used, and the fact that advances in machine learning will require trained engineers more than cutting-edge scientists, China could achieve its artificial intelligence (AI) goal. Given the importance of machine learning as a general-purpose technology that affects many domains, China’s gains in AI are of particular significance.(13)

為挑戰美國在尖端科技領域的主導地位，中國正在斥巨資開展研發工作。目前，~~華為~~在某些領域展現了出色的競爭力（編程隨想注：原文中根本【沒】提及「華為」，原譯者涉嫌夾帶私貨），還設定了到2030年成為人工智慧領域全球領導企業的戰略目標。有專家認為，中國坐擁海量數據資源，不存在數據隱私監管，且擁有大量人才儲備，很有可能在人工智慧領域取得突破。鑒於機器學習對其他領域通用技術的重要作用，中國在人工智慧領域取得進步具有特殊意義。

Chinese technological progress is no longer based solely on imitation. Although clumsily handled, the Donald Trump administration was correct to punish China for cyber theft of intellectual property, coerced intellectual property transfer, and unfair trade practices such as subsidized credit to state-owned enterprises. Reciprocity needs to be enforced. If China can ban Google and Facebook from its market for security reasons, the United States can surely take similar steps. Huawei and ZTE, for example, should not be allowed to participate in building American 5G networks. However, a successful American response to China’s technological challenge will depend upon improvements at home more than upon external sanctions.

而且，中國的技術進步不再僅僅基於抄襲和模仿。儘管處理方式欠妥，但特朗普政府對中國實施的懲罰很有必要。如果中國可以出於安全考慮禁止谷歌和 Facebook 進入其國內市場，那麼美國也完全可以採取類似的措施。例如，禁止華為和中興參与美國的 5G 網路建設。但美國要想成功應對來自中國的技術挑戰，還是要更多依靠國內改善，而非外部制裁。

American complacency is always a danger, but so also is lack of confidence and exaggerated fears that lead to overreaction. In the view of John Deutch, a former Provost of the Massachusetts Institute of Technology, if the United States attains its potential improvements in innovation potential, “China’s great leap forward will likely at best be a few steps toward closing the innovation leadership gap that the United States currently enjoys.” But notice the “if.”(14)（編程隨想注：這段整個被河蟹吃掉了！）

Devising a Strategy

美國的對華戰略設想

The United States holds high cards in its poker hand, but hysteria could cause it to fail to play its cards skillfully. When the Bill Clinton administration published its East Asian Strategy Report in 1995 to cope with the rise of China, we decided to reaffirm the U.S.-Japan alliance well before seeking to engage China in the World Trade Organization. Discarding our high cards of alliances and international institutions today would be a serious mistake. If the United States maintains its alliance with Japan, China cannot push it beyond the first island chain because Japan is a major part of that chain. Another possible mistake would be to try to cut off all immigration. When asked why he did not think China would pass the United States in total power any time soon, the late Singapore Prime Minister Lee Kuan Yew cited the ability of America to draw upon the talents of the whole world and recombine them in diversity and creativity that was not possible for China’s ethnic Han nationalism.(15) If the United States were to discard its high cards of external alliances and domestic openness today, Lee could be proven wrong.

美國手中握有王牌，但歇斯底里的情緒可能會影響出牌效果。為應對中國崛起，柯林頓政府於1995年發布《東亞戰略報告》，重申與日本之間牢固的同盟關係，而這種關係要遠遠早於中美關係的改善。如今，拋棄盟友和國際機構的做法將是一個嚴重的錯誤。如果美國維持與日本的同盟關係，中國就不能拒美國於第一島鏈之外。美國可能會犯的另一個錯誤是試圖切斷移民。當被問及為何中國的綜合實力不會很快超過美國時，已故新加坡總理李光耀指出，美國能夠接納全世界的人才，並充分激發他們的多樣性和創造力，這在以漢族占統治地位的中國是不可想象的。

（編程隨想注：本段落最後一句沒有翻譯）

As China’s power grows, some observers worry we are destined for war, but few consider an opposite disruptive danger. Rather than acting like a revolutionary power in the international order, China might decide to be a free rider like the United States was in the 1930s. China may act too weakly rather than too strongly and refuse to contribute to an international order that it did not create. China knows it has benefited substantially from the post-1945, Western international order.(16) In the United Nations Security Council, China is one of the five countries with a veto. China is now the second largest funder of UN peacekeeping forces and has participated in UN programs related to Ebola virus containment and climate change. China has also benefited greatly from economic institutions like the WTO and the International Monetary Fund, and is a party to the 2015 Climate Accords.

隨著中國實力的增強，部分觀察人士擔心中美之間必有一戰，但很少有人考慮與之相反的另一種危險。中國可能會像20世紀30年代的美國那樣選擇「搭便車」，而不是在國際秩序中成為一股革命性的力量。中國可能會表現得弱勢，而非強勢，並拒絕為一個並非由自己建立的國際秩序貢獻力量。中國深知自身從1945年後的西方國際秩序中獲益良多。目前，中國是聯合國安理會五大常任理事國之一，還是聯合國維和部隊第二大出資國，參与過抗擊埃博拉病毒、應對氣候變化等聯合國項目。中國還從世貿組織和國際貨幣基金組織等金融機構中受益，而且是2015年氣候協議締約國。

（編程隨想注：約瑟夫·奈在不止一個場合表達過這樣的擔心——如果天朝以【示弱】的姿態隱藏自己的實力，對美國而言更危險。而俺也在多篇博文中提到過——鄧矬子把【韜光養晦】當作天朝外交的基本原則；相比之下，習獃獃這個楞頭青在外交方面表現得太弱智啦！）

On the other hand, China has started its own Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank (AIIB) and the BRI program of international infrastructure projects that some see as an economic offensive. China has not practiced full reciprocity as a market economy, and its rejection of a 2016 Hague Tribunal ruling regarding the South China Sea raised questions about whether China would treat its legal obligations a la carte (as the United States has sometimes done). American and allied navies’ freedom of navigation operations in the South China Sea remain essential to maintain this point.

另一方面，中國啟動了亞投行和「一帶一路」倡議中的國際基礎設施項目，此舉被很多人士視為一種經濟攻勢。作為一個市場經濟國家，中國並沒有完全履行互惠原則。此外，中國還拒絕執行2016年海牙仲裁法庭關於南中國海問題的裁決，引發了國際社會關於中國能否履行其法律義務的爭論。從這個角度看，美國及其盟友的海軍在南中國海開展航行自由行動就顯得很有必要。

（編程隨想注：關於2016年的「南海仲裁案」，可參見俺在那年寫的博文《掃盲＜聯合國海洋法公約＞——幫你更好地解讀「中菲南海仲裁案」》）

Thus far, China has not tried to overthrow but rather to increase its influence within the world order from which it benefits, but this could change as Chinese power grows.(17) Appetites sometimes grow with eating, and Xi Jinping’s rhetoric about China as a great state suggests this could occur. The Trump administration has called China a revisionist power, but so far its revisionism has been quite moderate, unlike extreme revisionist powers such as Hitler’s Germany. China is not interested in kicking over the card table but in tilting the table so it can claim a larger share of the winnings. China’s growing economic power will create problems for the United States and the international order, and this friction will likely continue. The United States will have to manage alliances, networks, and institutions deftly to shape the environment in which China uses its growing power.

截至目前，中國並沒有表現出顛覆世界秩序的企圖，它只不過是想通過提升自身在世界秩序中的影響力來從中獲益。但隨著中國實力的增強，局面可能會發生改變。特朗普政府將中國稱為修正主義國家，但到目前為止，中國的修正主義相當溫和，不同於希特勒德國這種極端主義國家。中國不想打破局面，只是想讓局面朝有利於本國的方向發展。中國日益增長的經濟實力將給美國和國際秩序帶來挑戰。對此，美國將不得不妥善管理其盟友和關係網，塑造應對中國崛起的有利環境。

As Chinese power increases, the American-led, liberal international order will have to change. China has little interest in liberalism or American domination, but it does have a continuing interest in an “open and rules-based” world order. In the aftermath of the trade wars and COVID-19 pandemic, there is bound to be a degree of disengagement between the two countries.(18) The American approach to an open international economy will need to be adjusted for greater oversight of Chinese trade and investments that threaten its technological and national security objectives, but there is still a basis for fruitful interdependence and rules of the road to govern that independence. The West can also express its disagreement over values and human rights while cooperating on rules of the road related to matters where there are joint interests. Our values are an important source of our soft power.

隨著中國實力的增強，以美國為首的自由主義國際秩序將不得不做出改變。中國對美國主導下的自由主義提不起興趣，但卻對「開放和基於規則的」世界秩序充滿好感。貿易戰和新冠疫情過後，中美兩國間勢必會出現一定程度的疏離。美國對國際經濟的開放態度需要調整，以加強對威脅其技術和國家安全目標的中國貿易和投資的監管。西方也可以表達在價值觀和人權問題上與中國存在的分歧，同時在涉及共同利益的事務上加強內部合作。須知我們的價值觀是軟實力的重要體現。

In late 2017, President Trump announced a new National Security Strategy focused primarily on great power competition with China and Russia. It provided the benefit of a wake-up call, but as a strategy to protect American security, it is inadequate. Under the influence of the information revolution and globalization, world politics is changing. Even if the United States prevails over China as a great power, we cannot protect our security acting alone. COVID-19 is only the latest example of national security challenges that cannot be met unilaterally. Global financial stability is another; it is vital to the prosperity of Americans, but we need the cooperation of others to safeguard it. And regardless of potential setbacks to economic globalization caused by trade wars, environmental globalization will increase.

2017年底，特朗普總統發布了新版《國家安全戰略》，聚焦與中國和俄羅斯的大國競爭。新戰略給我們敲響了警鐘，但作為一份保護美國國家安全的戰略，這還遠遠不夠。在信息革命和全球化的影響下，世界政治格局正在發生變化。即便強大如美國，也不能獨善其身。新冠疫情對國家安全帶來的挑戰就是最好的證明。全球金融的穩定性是另一大問題，其對美國的繁榮至關重要，但美國需要與其他國家共同合作來維護這種穩定。除了貿易戰給經濟全球化帶來的潛在不利影響外，全球環境問題也日益顯現。

Pandemics, climate change, and economic instability threaten all Americans, but we cannot manage these problems alone. In a world where borders are becoming more porous to everything from drugs to infectious diseases to cyber terrorism, we must use our soft power of attraction to develop and cultivate networks and institutions capable of addressing these untraditional challenges.

疫情蔓延、氣候變化和經濟不穩定威脅著美國，但依靠美國自己的力量難以應對。當今世界，國家之間的界線越來越模糊，毒品、疾病和網路恐怖主義等可以輕易地從一國滲透到另一國，美國必須利用自己充滿吸引力的軟實力，開發和培塑能夠應對此類非傳統威脅的能力。

A successful national security strategy for the United States must begin with the recognition that our size and superpower status mean we have to lead the cooperation effort. A classic problem with public goods (like clean air, which all can share and from which none can be excluded) is that if the largest consumer does not take the lead, others will free-ride and the public goods will not be produced. President Trump’s National Security Strategy says little about these increasingly important transnational threats to national security. As the technology expert Richard Danzig summarizes the problem, “Twenty-first century technologies are global not just in their distribution, but also in their consequences. Pathogens, AI systems, computer viruses, and radiation that others may accidentally release could become as much our problem as theirs. Agreed reporting systems, shared controls, common contingency plans, norms and treaties must be pursued as a means of moderating our numerous mutual risks.”(19) Neither tariffs nor border walls can solve these problems. Even with American leadership, success will require the cooperation of others. The United States will have to work more closely with other countries and institutions rather than in the dismissive manner of the Trump administration.

對美國來說，必須清楚地認識到，成功的國家安全戰略意味著從領導合作開始。涉及「公共產品」（編程隨想注：原作者舉例啥是「公共產品」——例如所有人都可享用的清潔空氣。中譯文遺漏了這個舉例）的一個經典問題是，如果最大的消費者不帶頭，其他消費者就會選擇「搭便車」，公共產品就生產不出來。然而，特朗普總統的《國家安全戰略》幾乎沒有提及上述這些對國家安全日益重要的跨國威脅。正如前奧巴馬總統競選顧問理查德·丹齊格所說，「在21世紀，技術成果不僅由全世界共享，而且其影響也具有全球性。」病菌、人工智慧系統、計算機病毒以及意外釋放的輻射可能同樣會成為美國需要面對的難題。關稅壁壘和邊境牆解決不了這些問題，協商一致的報告制度，以及共同的應急方案、規範和條約，才是美國應對共同風險的有效手段。即便是在美國的領導下，成功也有賴於其他國家的合作。

（編程隨想注：中譯文遺漏本段最後一句，不影響大意）

On transnational issues like COVID-19, climate change, and global economic stability power becomes a positive-sum game. It is not sufficient to think in terms of American power over others. We must also think of power in terms of the ability to accomplish joint goals which involves power with others. On many transnational issues, empowering others can help us to accomplish our own goals. The United States benefits if China improves its energy efficiency and emits less carbon dioxide, or improves its public health systems. In the world of the 21st century, institutional networks and connectedness are an important source of national power. In a world of growing complexity, the most connected states are the most powerful. Washington has some sixty treaty allies while China has few, but we are squandering that strategic resource.

在新冠疫情、氣候變化和全球經濟穩定等跨國問題上，各國正在進行一場正和遊戲（編程隨想注：原文中的「game」譯為「博弈」更貼切）。單純考慮美國擁有的實力是不夠的，還必須從實現共同目標的角度出發，將其他國家的實力納入考慮範疇。在大多數跨國問題上，賦予他國權力可以幫助美國實現自己的目標。假設中國能夠提高能源效率，減少二氧化碳排放，或改善公共衛生系統，美國也將從中受益。在21世紀，關係網也是國家實力的重要組成部分。華盛頓有大約60個盟友，而中國卻寥寥無幾，但美國正在浪費這些戰略資源。

In the past, the openness of the United States enhanced its capacity to build networks, maintain institutions, and sustain alliances. But will that openness and willingness to engage with the rest of the world prove sustainable in the populist mood currently dominating American domestic politics, or will we see a 21st century analogue to our isolationism of the 1930s? Even if the United States continues to possess greater military, economic, and soft power resources than any other country, we may not choose to convert those resources into effective power behavior on the global scene. Between the two world wars, we did not and the result was disastrous.

在過去，美國的開放性是其建立關係網和維護與盟友關係的一大優勢。但在民粹主義主導國內政治風氣的背景下（編程隨想注：這裏所說的民粹主義應該是指川普上台之後的風氣），這種開放性和與世界其他國家接觸的意願還能否延續？或者說，我們是否會看到上世紀30年代的孤立主義在21世紀重新抬頭？即美國擁有比其他國家強大得多的軍事、經濟和軟實力，但美國可能不會把這些資源轉化成國際舞台上的有效行動。在兩次世界大戰期間，美國就沒有這樣做，其結果顯而易見。

（編程隨想注：最後一句的中譯文【不】嚴謹，會引發歧義。俺重新轉述為：在一戰後二戰前的那段時間，美國重回孤立主義，其結果是災難性的。）

If the key to America’s future security and prosperity is learning the importance of “power with” as well as “power over,” our current strategy is not up to the task. Every country puts its interests first, but the important question is how broadly or narrowly those interests are defined. Recent events have shown an inclination toward short-term, zero-sum transactional interpretations with little attention to institutions or allies. The United States appears to be stepping back from the long-term, enlightened self-interest that marked the security paradigm designed by Roosevelt, Truman, and Eisenhower after 1945, and successfully guided us through the Cold War. The new threat to our security is not just from transnational forces like COVID-19 and climate change but from our domestic failure to adjust own attitudes to this new world.

（編程隨想注：這段整個被河蟹吃掉了！）

Conclusion: Cooperative Rivalry

結論：學會合作競爭

Despite Russia and China’s current alliance of convenience against the United States, a real alliance of authoritarian countries similar to the Axis of the 1930s or the Sino-Soviet alliance of the 1950s is unlikely given the underlying mistrust between Russia and China and the difficulty of coordinating competing nationalist ideologies.(20) Today’s alliance of authoritarians lacks the soft power appeal of the 1950s, though steps will need to be taken to counter their covert “sharp power” threat to democratic values. China makes major soft power efforts to promote its authoritarian social model through economic inducements as well as manipulation of social media.(21) However, while Maoism used to bring protesters onto the world’s streets, it is unlikely that many protesters will march under the banner of “Xi Jinping Thought about Socialism with Chinese Characteristics.”

儘管俄羅斯和中國是當前對抗美國最便利的聯盟，但考慮到俄中兩國之間潛在的不信任感和意識形態上存在的巨大分歧，類似上世紀50年代的中蘇聯盟不太可能出現。（編程隨想注：此處有刪節。原文中把「50年代的中蘇同盟」與「30年代的法西斯軸心國」相提並論）即便中俄結成盟友，也不會像上世紀的中蘇聯盟那樣，在軟實力方面具有很強的吸引力。中國為提升軟實力付出了大量努力，通過經濟誘導和操控社交媒體來推廣其威權主義社會模式。

（編程隨想注：本段最後一句被刪節了，是吐槽【習包子】的。

作者在這段話中認為：中俄【難以】建立同盟關係。俺在更早之前的博文《聊聊「核戰略的博弈模型」與「中美新冷戰」》也表達了類似的觀點。

Since the Nixon era, China and the United States have cooperated despite ideological differences. Rapid Asian economic growth has encouraged a horizontal power shift to the region, but Asia has its own internal balance of power. Chinese power is balanced by Japan, India, and Australia among others. None want to be dominated by China. The United States will remain crucial to that Asian balance of power. If the United States maintains those alliances, the prospects are slight that in the traditional interstate competition China can drive the United States from the Western Pacific, much less dominate the world. The United States holds the high cards in the traditional great power competition. The question is whether it will play them well.

自尼克鬆時代以來，中美兩國雖然存在意識形態上的分歧，但始終保持著合作狀態。儘管亞洲地區經濟的快速增長促使全球力量向該地區轉移，但亞洲地區內部也在尋求一種力量平衡機制。日本、印度和澳大利亞等國都在制衡中國。沒有國家希望被中國控制。美國仍將是亞洲力量平衡的關鍵。如果美國能夠與其亞洲盟友保持同盟關係，那麼在與中國展開的傳統競爭中，美國很難出局。在傳統的大國競爭中，盟友就是美國的王牌，關鍵是美國能否有效發揮其作用。

The more difficult question for an effective national security strategy will be whether the United States and China can develop attitudes that allow them to cooperate in producing global public goods while competing in the traditional areas of great power competition. Exaggerated fears and worst-case analyses may make such a balanced policy impossible. The U.S.-China relationship is a cooperative rivalry where a successful strategy of “smart competition,” as advocated by Orville Schell and Susan Shirk, will require equal attention to both aspects of that description.(22) But such a future will require good contextual intelligence, careful management on both sides, and no major miscalculations. That will be a hard test of the skills of our leaders.

就國家安全戰略而言，美中兩國在保持大國競爭的同時，能否在全球公共產品領域開展合作是一個難題。過分恐慌和「凡事都往壞處想」可能不會促成這種平衡。歸根結底，美中之間是一種合作競爭關係。因此，成功的戰略就如同夏偉（Orville Schell）和謝淑麗（Susan Shirk）所倡導的「聰明的競爭」，即把競爭與合作放在同等重要的位置。但這需要良好的情境智慧能力，雙方細緻的自我管理，以及不出現重大誤判。總而言之，這將是對美國領導人的一次重大考驗。

Notes

(1) See Oswald Spengler, trans. Charles Francis Atkinson, The Decline of the West. (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1926); Francis Fukuyama, The End of History and the Last Man. (New York, Free Press, 1992); Samuel P Huntington, The Clash of Civilizations. (New York, Simon & Schuster, 1996).

(2) Joseph S. Nye, Jr., The Future of Power (New York: Public Affairs, 2011). Chapter 6.

(3) Bill Emmott, Rivals: How the Power Struggle Between China, India and Japan Will Shape Our Next Decade. (New York: Harcourt, 2008). This insight provides the basis for the most plausible strategies among the four outlined (accommodation, collective balancing, comprehensive pressure, regime change) by Hal Brands and Zack Cooper, “After Responsible Stakeholder, What? Debating America’s China Strategy,” Texas National Security Review, February 2020.

(4) Graham Allison, Destined for War: Can America and China Escape Thucydides’ Trap? (New York: Houghton Mifflin, 2018). Michael Beckley challenges this analysis and argues that power transition theory is littered with false positives and false negatives. “The Power of Nations: Measuring What Matters,” International Security, 43, no. 2 (Fall 2018), 42–43. Kori Schake argues that there has been only one case. Safe Passage: The Transition from British to American Hegemony. (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2017).

(5) See Joshua Shifrinson, Rising Titans: Falling Giants (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 2018).

(6) Michael Beckley, “The Power of Nations: Measuring What Matters,” International Security 43, no. 2 (Fall 2018). 22.

(7) Chas W. Freeman Jr, “China’s National Experiences and the Evolution of PRC Grand Strategy,” in David Shambaugh, ed. China and the World (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2020). 56.

(8) See “Special Report: China’s Belt and Road,” The Economist, February 8, 2020.

(9) Portland Consultancy, The Soft Power 30. London, 2018.

(10) Kai-Fu Lee, AI Superpowers: China, Silicon Valley and the New World Order (Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 2018), 83.

(11) Meghan O’Sullivan, Windfall: How the New Energy Abundance Upends Global Politics and Strengthens America’s Power (New York: Simon & Schuster, 2017).

(12) Adele Hayutin, Global Workforce Change: Demographics Behind the Headlines (Stanford, CA: The Hoover Institution, 2018).

(13) Lee, AI Superpowers.

(14) John Deutch, “Assessing and Responding to China’s Innovation Initiative,” in Maintaining America’s Edge, ed. Leah Bitounis and Jonathon Price (Washington: Aspen Institute, 2019), 163.

(15) Conversation with Lee Kuan Yew, Singapore, September 22, 2012. See also Joseph S. Nye, Jr. Is the American Century Over? (Cambridge: Polity Press, 2015). 77.

(16) Ceri Parker, “China’s Xi Jinping Defends Globalization from the Davos Stage,” World Economic Forum, January 27, 2017; “Statement by Wang Yi,” filmed February 17, 2017, Munich Security Conference, 23:41.

(17) Michael Mazarr, Timothy Heath, and Astrid Cevallos, China and the International Order (Santa Monica, CA: RAND Corporation, 2018), 4.

(18) I go into details in Joseph Nye, “Power and Interdependence with China,” The Washington Quarterly 43, no. 1, (2020). 7-21.

(19) This section is adapted from my book Do Morals Matter? Presidents and Foreign Policy from FDR to Trump. (New York: Oxford University Press, 2020).

(20) See Bobo Lo, A Wary Embrace: What the Russia–China Relationship Means for the World (Docklands, VIC: Penguin Random House Australia, 2017).

(21) Larry Diamond and Orville Schell, Chinese Influence & American Interests: Promoting Constructive Vigilance (Stanford, CA: Hoover Institution Press, 2018).

(22) Orville Schell and Susan L Shirk, Chairs, Course Correction: Toward an Effective and Sustainable China Policy. (New York: Asia Society Task Force, February 2019).

（編程隨想注：左邊是英文版的註解；中文翻譯【沒】包含註解）

★俺的點評

◇先聊聊【翻譯】的問題

從這篇中英文照可以看出——翻譯過程的刪節，使得中譯文千瘡百孔。由於咱們天朝有非常嚴厲（非常變態）的審查制度。所以【牆內】的譯者在翻譯洋文的時候，必須隨時進行自我審查，才會導致這樣的結果。建議那些擅長洋文的同學，在看老外寫的文章或書籍時，盡量看原著；不那麼擅長洋文的同學，強迫自己多看，再藉助「Google 翻譯]」之類的工具，也能提升自己的洋文水平。

順便說一下：俺的網盤上分享了很多電子書。對於【外國作者】寫的書，俺都儘可能同時分享中文版與英文版（除非俺手頭沒有）。

◇美國佬的優勢

最近2年，俺在博客評論區與讀者交流時，不止一次地引用過如下這個排比句：控制了石油，就控制了工業；
控制了海洋，就控制了貿易；
控制了貨幣，就控制了金融；
控制了糧食，就控制了人類。

這段是從網上看到的，有人說出自基辛格。俺沒有去考證出處，不確定是不是他所說。到底是誰說的，並不重要；重要的是——這段話點出了4個不同維度的【命門】。而這4個命門都完全控制在美國佬手中。

約瑟夫·奈的這篇文章談到了上述4個維度的前3個，但遺漏了最後一個（也是最重要的一個）。關於天朝的糧食風險，俺在《從量變到質變——中美關係40年》一文的末尾有如下這段：在談貿易戰之前，先說一些預備知識。

1.天朝是【排名第一】的大米和大豆進口國（除了這兩項，其它農產品的進口量，俺沒空細查，估計也是排前幾名）。
與天朝相反，美國是最大的糧食及農產品出口國（沒有之一）。

2.天朝是主要的能源進口國美國是主要的能源出口國（得益於「頁岩氣革命」）

3.天朝賣給美國的商品（比如：服裝、日用品、電器、等），如果天朝停止供應，美國佬自己也能造出來。美國賣給天朝的東西，有很多（比如：高端晶元、大豆、民航客機、等）是天朝自己搞不出來滴。尤其像大豆和高端晶元，還是咱們非買不可滴！

既然說到「大豆」，順便展開一下（請允許俺稍微跑題）很多國內的憤青對「大豆」存在【誤解】。

誤解1：如果美國不賣給中國大豆，中國可以自己種

澄清：大豆的種植很消耗耕地。以中國的大豆進口量（以每年9000萬噸計算），如果全部改為自己種植，大約消耗【1/5至1/4】的國內耕地。那其它農作物咋辦？

誤解2：如果美國不賣給中國大豆，中國還可以找巴西和阿根廷買

澄清：雖然大豆出口國前三名是「美國、巴西、阿根廷」，但這三國的大豆生產又被【四大國際糧商】控制四大國際糧商分別是：美國ADM、美國邦吉、美國嘉吉、法國路易達孚（請注意：前三名都是美國佬）。另外別忘了：拉美是美國的「後院」。如果美國佬下定決心不給你大豆，你以為咱天朝還能從巴西/阿根廷手中買到嗎？

誤解3：沒了大豆，咱們就不吃豆製品唄。

澄清：進口的大豆可【不光是】用來搞豆製品滴。別的不說，光【豆粕】就是養豬業的主要【廉價】飼料來源。
沒了廉價的豆粕，豬肉價格會明顯上漲。而歷朝歷代以來，都把「肉價/米價」的穩定視作社會穩定的基礎。

◇美國佬的優勢——其本質在於【人才優勢】

上述提到了4個維度，美國佬都能佔據【絕對主導】的地位。很多人認為：美國佬是因為具備了軍事優勢，才能建立上述這4個優勢。但這種觀點依然停留在【表象】。更本質的原因在於——美國佬具有人才優勢（「軍事優勢」也需要「人才優勢」才能建立並維持）。

關於「人才」這個話題，約瑟夫·奈在這篇文章中提到了：當被問及為何中國的綜合實力不會很快超過美國時，已故新加坡總理李光耀指出，美國能夠接納全世界的人才，並充分激發他們的多樣性和創造力，這在以漢族占統治地位的中國是不可想象的。

類似的觀點，俺在兩年前（2018）的博文《厲害國真的很厲害嗎？——給小粉紅們潑點冷水》也提到了。在那篇博文中，俺花了很長篇幅談「人才的重要性」以及「中美之間的差異」。在談「中美人才差距」時，俺總結了4點。李光耀提到的那句話，只是其中一點。

◇天朝的問題

天朝的問題有很多，有大有小，有難有易。俺個人認為：真正的難題是那些【嚴重依賴時間】的問題。啥意思捏？比如說「民主化轉型、建立人才儲備、改善人口結構、保障糧食安全」（或諸如此類的問題），這些都要花好幾代人的時間才能慢慢搞定。

如果沒有發生「中美新冷戰」，天朝本來可以花時間逐步解決這些問題（俺稱之為「騰挪的餘地」）。但由於習獃獃太傻逼，在自身實力遠遠不如美國佬的情況下，就主動進行各種挑釁（比如：一帶一路、南海造島、香港送中條例……）。經過習獃獃的不懈努力，美國各界終於對【反中】達成高度共識。等到美國佬開始竭盡全力地圍堵/遏制天朝，那麼，「騰挪的餘地」就被擠壓掉了。

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